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‘Political…Civil and Domestic Slavery’: Harriet 
Taylor Mill and Anna Doyle Wheeler on 
Marriage, Servitude, and Socialism.  
 
Harriet Taylor Mill (1807-1858) and Anna Doyle Wheeler (1780-1848) are philosophers 
overshadowed by the men with whom they co-authored – John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and 
William Thompson (1785-1833). Unlike Mary Wollstonecraft, although they both achieved brief 
notoriety in the 19th century, they did not establish themselves – particularly to posthumous 
memory – as figures with their own claim to be included in the canon, though interest in them has 
increased in recent years.1 However, both made important, and interesting, contributions to 
political thought, particularly regarding deconstruction of the patriarchal institution of marriage 
and the current property regime. They were part of a radical utilitarian milieu surrounding Jeremy 
Bentham, and were also involved with utopian socialism, though it is unlikely that they ever met. 
Both were feminists, utilitarians, and socialists, and contributed new ideas to these schools of 
thought. Interesting differences and similarities in their ideas make them worthy of comparison; 
and the insightfulness of their critiques makes them worthy of contemporary study. 
In this article I outline the reasons we should consider both as the co-authors of their more famous 
male counterparts, and briefly explore the possibility that Wheeler and Thompson were a ‘model’ 
for Taylor and Mill. My main focus is on comparing and contrasting their claim that marriage was 
a form of slavery, and the proposals they offered to free women from the domination of patriarchal 
relationships, in particular how they thought female emancipation would be most truly realised via 
cooperative socialism.  
1. Co-Authoring, Contribution and Conscious Modelling. 
In 1825 Thompson published Appeal of the One Half of the Human Race, Women, Against the Pretentions 
of the Other Half, Men, to Retain them in Political, and thence in Civil, and Domestic Servitude: in reply to a 
paragraph of Mr. [James] Mill’s celebrated “Article on Government”. It starts with a lengthy ‘Introductory 
Letter to Mrs Wheeler’ written ‘to perform … a debt of justice; to show myself possessed of that 
sincerity which I profess to admire’ and not be guilty of literary ‘piracy’.2 Thompson explains that 
he has ‘endeavoured to arrange the expression of those feelings, sentiments, and reasonings, which 
have emanated from your mind’. The Appeal contains ‘on paper, what you have so often discussed 
in conversation’ regarding ‘the condition of women…in what is called civilised society’. ‘[T]hanks 
to the chance of being born a man’, Thompson does not have the same life-experience from which 
to write, ‘yet can I not be inaccessible to the plain facts and reason of the case’. He is ‘indebted’ to 
Wheeler ‘for those bolder and more comprehensive views’ which are now so much his that ‘to 
separate your thoughts from mine were now to me impossible’. Thus, Appeal is presented as an 
‘arrangeme[nt] [of] our common ideas’ (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, v-vii).  
Thompson admits Wheeler had no hand in penning the manuscript of Appeal, as ‘leisure and 
resolution to undertake the drudgery of the task were wanting’ on her part.3 ‘A few only therefore 
of the following pages are the exclusive produce of your mind and pen, and written with your own 
 
1 See McCabe, ‘Harriet Taylor Mill’ and ‘Harriet Taylor’; Cory, ‘Rhetorical Re-Visioning’; Jose, ‘Without Apology’; and 
Philips, ‘Beloved and Deplored’. 
2 I follow Cory (‘Rhetorical Re-Visoning’, 114) in treating Thompson as the Letter’s sole author.  
3 Though see Dooley (Equality in Community, 79-80) for why these might not have been Wheeler’s only reasons. 
hand. The remainder are our joint property, I being your interpreter and the scribe of your 
sentiments’ (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, vii).4  
In a similar vein, though detailing a longer relationship, Mill (Autobiography, 247) recalls a long-
standing ‘partnership of thought, feeling, and writing’ with Taylor, which began in 1830.5 In 1833, 
Mill and Taylor penned matching essays On Marriage (Mill, Marriage, 35-49; Taylor, Complete Works, 
17-24).6 Taylor also published (anonymously, but her authorship seems to have been an open 
secret) Enfranchisement of Women (1851) – the notes for it, along with other notes which bear more 
resemblance to Subjection of Women are in both her and Mill’s hand (Taylor and Mill, Papers on 
Women’s Rights). 
Taylor played a variety of roles in co-authoring Mill’s work. He says, when two people have ‘their 
thoughts and speculations completely in common … all subject of intellectual or moral interest 
are discussed between them in daily life, and probed to much greater depths than … usually or 
conventionally’; when they ‘set out from the same principles’, and ‘arrive at their conclusions by 
processes jointly pursued’, then: 
[I]t is of little consequences in respect to the question of originality which 
of them holds the pen; the one who contributes least to the composition 
may contribute most to the thought; the writings which result are the joint 
product of both, and it must often be impossible to disentangle their 
respective parts and affirm that this belongs to one and that to another. 
‘In this wide sense’, he adds, ‘all my published writings were as much her work as mine’, with many 
of ‘the most valuable ideas … in these joint productions … originat[ing] with her’ (Mill, 
Autobiography, 251). Some more specific cases of co-authoring include: ‘working together’ on ‘every 
sentence’ of On Liberty; influencing the ‘tone’, or fundamental ontology, of Principles of Political 
Economy as well as dictating some key passages; and co-authoring a series of articles on domestic 
violence (Mill, Autobiography, 249 and 255; Taylor (and Mill), Complete Works, 77-131).  
Despite Thompson’s ‘Introductary Letter’, Wheeler’s role as co-author has been underplayed 
historically, though now generally acknowledged. Much less has Taylor been recognised as Mill’s 
co-author, Mill’s claims about which have been denied and denigrated (see Jabobs, ‘Gifted Ladies’; 
Philips, ‘Beloved and Deplored’, 627 and 639-40; and McCabe ‘Harriet Taylor Mill’, 121-123). But 
if we accept the arguments put forward for Wheeler’s co-authorship of Appeal, then we ought also 
to accept those made about Taylor, and begin to reapprise both women’s position in the ‘canon’ 
of political thought. 
That the Appeal was so openly credited as being co-authored was radical and – at the time – unique7. 
Mill’s one public attempt during their lifetimes to acknowledge Taylor’s input – a dedicatory 
 
4 The concluding ‘Address to Women’ is generally seen as being more by Wheeler than Thompson, though her 
authorship should not be limited to that section, – see Cory, ‘Rhetorical Revisioning’, 113-119; Jose, ‘Without 
Apology’, 831-32; and Dooley, Equality in Community, 69-70 for analysis of Wheeler’s distinctive style, and evidence 
of it in Appeal. 
5 For more on their relationship, see McCabe, ‘Harriet Taylor Mill’; Rossi, ‘Sentiment and Intellect’; and Miller, ‘Harriet 
Taylor Mill’. 
6 The various drafts of both essays are undated. Taylor’s is written on paper watermarked 1831 and 1832, and Jacobs 
(‘Chronology’, xlii) gives an 1832 date as does Hayek for Mill’s piece. However, for plausible text-based reasons, 
Robson (‘Textual Introduction’, lix-lx) suggests summer 1833 for Mill’s piece because of which, and because she 
quotes Tennyson’s Eleanore, first published in 1833, I give this date for Taylor’s piece, too.  
7 See also Jose (‘Without Apology’, 833-4) for discussion of why Wheeler was not more formally acknowledged as the 
co-author; and Cory (‘Rhetorical Re-Visioning’, 106) for discussion of the implications of a portrait of Wheeler being 
the frontispiece and (111-113) how Thompson reverses the usual gendered authorial roles in his ‘Introductory 
Letter’. 
passage for first edition of Principles (1848) 8 – was scotched by Taylor’s (or perhaps her husband’s 
– see Rossi, ‘Sentiment and Intellect’, pp.39-41) ‘dislike of publicity’ (Mill, Autobiography, 257). 
However, Mill and Taylor left a meticulous account of the different ways in which they collaborated 
in the Autobiography (in which Taylor had a significant editorial hand). Many elements of this 
account bear striking resemblance to Thompson’s description of working with Wheeler, giving 
weight to the suggestion that they may have provided a model for Mill and Taylor’s own 
complicated relationship.  
This possibility seems to have been first mooted by Terence Ball who ‘conjecture[s] … that 
Thompson’s chaste and cerebral relationship with Mrs Wheeler provided a model for … Mill’s 
subsequent relationship with … Taylor’ (Ball, ‘Utilitarianism’, 206). Jose (‘Without Apology’, 844-
45) also sees the younger pair taking the elder as ‘a model’, in a similarly Platonic way. Noting that 
all four thinkers share the idea of marriage as ‘sympathetic association’, he praises Wheeler and 
Thompson for ‘recognis[ing] that mutual and respectful shared sensual gratification was an 
important, indeed necessary, part of egalitarian, loving relationships’ (though not suggesting it was 
any part of their own egalitarian relationship), but reads Mill and Taylor as ‘remain[ing] much more 
closely in tune with the sexual stereotypes of [the] Victorian era’. Rossi (‘Sentiment and Intellect’, 
p.10) also ‘surmises that “passion” in the lives of both … Mill and Harriet [Taylor] was a sublimated 
and highly intellectualised emotion’. However, though Taylor certainly linked sexual pleasure with 
the imagination, and contrasted this ‘higher pleasure’ with ‘sensuality’, this is not to say she 
‘intellectualised’ it. Similarly, she thought people could assert rational control over sexual impulses, 
but this does not mean she ‘subliminated’ passion. (For more on this, see McCabe, ‘Harriet Taylor’. 
Also note Dooley, Equality in Community 81-82 for whether Ball and Jose read Thompson and 
Wheeler’s relationship correctly.)  
More important than whether or not both pairs had ‘chaste’, ‘intellectual’ relationships is the 
thought that Thompson and Wheeler modelled equality for Mill and Taylor, personally and 
professionally. Jose (‘Without Apology’, 841) says Mill’s account of co-authoring with Taylor 
‘eerlier echoes’ Thompson’s account of co-authoring with Wheeler: my suggestion is that there is 
nothing uncanny about it.  
The similarity might be a coincidence. Perhaps what Mill and Thompson say could be said of any 
co-authoring relationship – but it is striking that they are rare (perhaps unique) among men in 
writing about themselves as ‘scribes’ and ‘interpreters’ of a woman’s thought (see Cory, ‘Rhetorical 
Re-Visioning’, many of whose arguments also apply to Mill). Perhaps Thompson/Mill and 
Wheeler/Taylor were quite similar, so their co-authoring relationships was also similar. There may 
be some truth in this, but – though as Ball (‘Utilitarianism’, 206) notes there is no direct 
testamentary evidence – we do see potentially deliberate echoes of Thompson’s account in Mill.  
Like Thompson calling himself a ‘scribe’, ‘interpreter’ and one who ‘arrange[d] ... expression’ of 
ideas ‘which … emanated from’ Wheeler (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, v), Mill writes, 
‘[d]uring the greater part of my literary life I have performed the office in relation to her … of an 
interpreter of original thinkers, and mediator between them and the public’ (Mill, Autobiography, 
251). Similarly, Mill (Autobiography, 251-261) recalls writing down for publication what had been ‘so 
often discussed’ (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, v) between him and Taylor, and describes his 
Marriage (37) as ‘a written exposition of … opinions’ prompted by Taylor, following conversations 
between them on the topic.   
Mill (Autobiography, 256) also expresses gratitude to his female co-author for ‘those bolder and more 
comprehensive views’ (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, vi): ‘I was her pupil, alike in boldness of 
 
8 The dedication read: ‘To Mrs. John Taylor. as the most eminently qualified of all persons known to the author either 
to originate or to appreciate speculations on social improvement, this attempt to explain and diffuse ideas many of 
which were first learned from herself, is with the highest respect and regard, dedicated.’  
speculation and cautiousness of practical judgment … she was much more courageous and 
farsighted than without her I should have been, in anticipations of things to come’. Again, like 
Thompson (‘Introductory Letter’, vi-vii) noting that ‘to separate your thoughts from mine were 
now to me impossible’ and that Appeal is an ‘arrangeme[nt] [of] our common ideas’, Mill 
(Autobiography, 259) writes of Liberty being a ‘conjunction of her mind with mine’, and that:  
[I]t is difficult to identify any particular part or element as being more hers 
than all the rest. The whole mode of thinking of which the book was the 
expression, was emphatically hers. But I also was so thoroughly imbued 
with it that the same thought naturally occurred to us both. 
Lastly, just as Thompson notes ‘can I not be inaccessible to the plain facts and reason of the case’ 
(Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter, v-vi) for women’s equality, Mill (Autobiography, 251) rejects what 
he suspects most will think – that Taylor’s influence over his ‘mental growth’ would be solely 
around ‘equality … between men and women’9 – and insists ‘those convictions were among the 
earliest results of the application of my mind to political subjects’, though, ‘until I knew her, the 
opinion was, in my mind, little more than an abstract principle’.10 Taylor made this less ‘abstract’. 
Philips (‘Beloved and Deplored’, 633-34) argues that Taylor was more concerned with the 
‘everyday’ nature of women’s oppression, and their joint works are filled with ‘practicalities’ and 
details which are missing from Mill’s single-authored feminist pieces. Her analysis is generally 
excellent, and helps flesh out Mill’s (Autobiography, 251) account ‘that perception of the vast 
practical bearing of women’s disabilities which found expression in … Subjection … was acquired 
mainly through her teaching’, without which he ‘should have had a very insufficient perception of 
the mode in which the consequences of the inferior position of women intertwine themselves with 
all the evils of existing society and with all the difficulties of human improvement’.11  
It seems plausible – and indeed Mill himself seems to say – that Taylor’s lived experience and 
recognition of the importance of the everyday in women’s oppression informed her feminism, and 
also enriched his. Mill does not make exactly the same claim as Thompson (‘Introductary Letter, 
v-vi), that being ‘born a man’ he cannot see these things, but – by extension – because she was 
‘born a woman’, Wheeler can. In part, this is because Mill wants to make a more general claim for 
Taylor’s unique genius, marrying imagination and great practical sagacity (Mill, Autobiography, 195 
and 256), and also because both he and Taylor were chary of anything which seemed to suggest 
that women ‘innately’ understood things better than men (Mill, Subjection, 304-306), or that they 
were ‘innately’ ‘higher’ or ‘better’ beings (Mill, Letter 261, 509-510). However, Mill’s description of 
Taylor’s contribution to their joint feminism links to Thompson’s idea that his experiences as a 
man blinded him to some problems which were much more evident to his female co-author.  
2. Marriage and Slavery. 
Leaving aside the question of conscious modelling by Taylor/Mill, I turn now to the second part 
of this article: mapping Taylor and Wheeler’s shared, though not identical, claim that marriage was 
a form of slavery, and the proposals they offered to free women from the domination of patriarchal 
relationships. Jose (‘Without Apology’, 843-844) also charts similarities between the analysis of 
 
9 See Philips (‘Beloved and Deplored’, 632-33) for an interesting analysis of why Mill might have made this assertion 
in the Autobiography.  
10 Rossi (‘Sentiment and Intellect’, 20-22 and 24-26) gives a good account of the feminist Utilitarian/Unitarian 
background of both Taylor and Mill when they met. 
11 However, though Mill does often give ‘exalted’ rather than everyday examples in Subjection, sometimes this is because 
he is referring to specific arguments about women-as-rulers (Philips, ‘Beloved and Deplored’, 633; Mill, Subjection, 
299-322). It is true, though, that there is no corresponding passage to that probably authored by Taylor (though the 
surviving copy is in Mill’s hand) where she charts how women’s practical involvement in politics (e.g. Abolition and 
prison reform) has had a beneficial effect, making people more capable of acting in the common good (Mill and 
Taylor, Papers on Women’s Rights, 385). 
marriage-as-slavery in Appeal and Subjection.12 In this article, I seek to tease out this analogy in 
Taylor’s writing, which is subtly different to Mill’s, as well as to Wheeler’s. That is, I am particularly 
interested in how two women who had experienced marriage formulated, and used, the marriage-
as-slavery analogy (even though having to piece together their thought, on occasion, via words 
written by their male co-authors describing their views).  
Thompson and Wheeler call ‘the existing system of marriage’, an institution ‘under which, for the 
mere faculty of eating, breathing and living, in whatever degree of comfort husbands may think fit, 
women are reduced to domestic slavery, without a will of their own, or power of locomotion, 
otherwise than as permitted by their respected masters’ (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, xi). The 
whole title of their book makes plain the connection they saw between women’s lack of voting 
(and other political) rights; women’s lack of economic and educational opportunities; marriage; and 
slavery.  
Women’s exclusion from political rights, legal protections, and educational and economic 
opportunities which allow for independence without marrying leaves them in the position of 
‘slaves’, because someone can legally exercise almost absolute power over them (Thompson and 
Wheeler, Appeal, 41-42). This involves control over where they live; whether, when and with whom 
they leave the house; over their property and income (if any); over their sexual lives; over their 
friendships; over their children; over what they learn and their ambitions for life; and, ultimately, 
over all their interests, and everything that contributes to their happiness. Marriage merely allows 
women to swap the despotism of a father for that of a husband. Wives and daughters might not 
be subjected – in Europe – to the kind of brutal treatment experienced by slaves as we generally 
imagine them, but regarding their rights, they are in the same position.  
Moreover, Wheeler argues, all the vices usually considered ‘natural’ to, and irremediable in, women, 
‘are the vices of slaves’, caused by tyranny, and curable by equality (Wheeler, Rights of Women, 35 
qtd. in McFadden, ‘Wheeler’, 96). Women are made to fawn, be sycophantic, think only about 
narrow interests, be ‘irrational’, live only for their looks, for love, for their families etc., because 
their unequal position means they must secure a husband, and this is what they are told (probably 
rightly) that a husband wants (very few men appreciating the ‘higher pleasures’ of intercourse with 
an equal) (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, xi). For these reasons, giving a lecture in in 1829, 
entitled Rights of Women, Wheeler even introduced herself as speaking ‘in my capacity as slave and 
woman’ (Wheeler, Rights of Women, qtd in McFadden, ‘Wheeler’, 96).13  
Taylor’s claim is never quite as strident. In Papers on Women’s Rights (380) she does say that because 
‘the disabilities of women’ being ‘disabilities by birth’ which a woman ‘cannot by any exertion get 
rid of’, ‘[t]his makes her case … like that of the negro in America’, her disabilities being ‘indelible 
 
12 Jose (‘Without Apology’, 843) notes that, when Subjection was published ‘slavery had been abolished in the British 
Empire’. We might also add that 13th Amendment had been passed in the USA. Appeal, however, was written eight 
years before the British Slavery Abolition Act. Thus, he argues Mill ‘could not presuppose, as could Wheeler and 
Thompson, an energised antislavery discourse’ in the audience of his work. Arguably, though, Mill is attempting (as 
with other feminists) to extend the energy of the Abolitionist movement to what they saw as female slavery, rather 
than letting its momentum fade. Moreover, the fact that the American Civil War (1861-1865) was so recent a 
memory, and had ended in victory for the North and the passing of the 13th Amendment, adds rhetorical weight to 
Mill’s claim about women’s slavery: slavery was now abolished in countries which considered themselves ‘advanced’ 
everywhere but in the home. Slavery was legal in more places when Appeal was published, it is true, but slavery was 
still politically salient in Mill’s day. (Though increased knowledge of the conditions experienced in the Southern 
States of America may underly Taylor’s caution regarding claiming marriage is slavery, and wives are slaves.) 
13 I am very aware that this way of speaking – and the Appeal’s appeal to the position of enslaved people in the 
Caribbean – might cause offence to the modern reader, perhaps more aware of – or more sensitive towards – the 
horrors and injustice of trans-Atlantic slavery, and the vast gulf in experience between even a woman in Wheeler’s 
position (white and wealthy, though married to an abusive husband with no legal, political or economic rights as a 
single woman) and that of any enslaved African. I am not endorsing Wheeler’s claim (or, later, Taylor’s and/or 
Mill’s), just laying it out.  
ones’. However, she is not likening women’s position to slavery, but saying that women’s exclusion 
from equality of opportunity on the basis of a biological and social construct (sex/gender) is as 
permanent as exclusions on the grounds of race in America.  
Similarly, she traces as history of society from an Hobbesian state of nature where ‘the races and 
tribes which are vanquished in war are made slaves, the absolute property of their conquerors’ 
through a ‘gradual progress’ whereby ‘[m]orality recommended kind treatment of slaves by their 
masters, and just rule by despots over their subjects, but it never justified or tolerated either slaves 
or subjects in throwing off the yoke’, a case about which she says ‘[i]t is needless to point out how 
exactly the parallel holds in the case of women and men’ (Taylor and Mill, Papers on Women’s Rights, 
387).  
Similarly, she emphasises the ‘domestic subjection’ of women, which she says will ‘will be 
acknowledged to be as monstrous an infraction of the rights and dignity of humanity, as slavery is 
at last’ (Taylor and Mill, Papers on Women’s Rights, 387). She also notes that there are ‘practical’ 
differences in the treatment of ‘subjected’ women, ‘as … in the case of slaves’ through history, 
‘from being slowly murdered by continued bodily torture, to being only subdued in spirit and 
thwarted of all those higher and finer developments of individual character of which personal 
liberty has in all ages been felt to be the indispensable condition’. That is, in several places Taylor 
makes a comparison between marriage and slavery, or using slavery (as the exemplar of the worst 
form of despotism) as an analogy to marriage, but this is subtly different to claiming marriage is the 
same as slavery, or is a form of slavery. 
This said, she does say ‘[t]he exclusion of women from the suffrage becomes a greater offence and 
degradation in proportion as the suffrage is opened widely to all men. When the only privileged 
class is the aristocracy of sex the slavery of the excluded sex is more marked and complete’ (Taylor 
and Mill, Papers on Women’s Rights, 390). She also asserts that when humanity was ‘in a primitive 
condition’, ‘women were and are the slaves of men for the purposes of toil’, and that in a slightly 
further stage of human progress, ‘women were and are the slaves of men for the purposes of 
sensuality’. Passing through a ‘third and milder dominion’, beginning in Ancient Greece, whereby 
‘[t]he wife was part of the furniture of home’, subject to ‘a patriarch and a despot’, but recognised 
as someone to whom men might owe ‘kindness, and…duty’, in modern times she identifies ‘a sense 
of correlative obligation’: ‘The power of husbands has reached the stage which the power of kings 
had arrived at, when opinion did not yet question the rightfulness of arbitrary power, but in theory, 
and to a certain extent in practice, condemned the selfish use of it’. This position, ‘that women 
should be, not slaves, nor servants, but companions’ is, she thinks, the position of ‘moderate 
reformers of the education of women’ (Taylor, Enfranchisement of Women, 406-408). Taylor herself 
argues for much more equality.  
In the main, then, we see in Taylor a more nuanced argument – though similar to Wheeler’s – that 
the underlying justifications given for slavery (that ‘might is right’, or that greater power or strength 
is a normative justification for rule; that there are natural, justifiable hierarchies of power and status; 
and that ‘dependence’ is some people’s ‘natural’ and ‘right’ state) are those also given for women’s 
inequality. Similarly, that historical relationships which allowed men to tyrannise over women (and, 
often, other men) are still prevalent today, and persist in marriages; in women’s education; in the 
lack of opportunities afforded women outside of marriage; their lack of legal, political, social and 
economic rights; and in father’s control over their daughters. Moreover, that as society progresses, 
we move more and more towards equality. This is happening, ‘very tardily’ as she puts it, with race 
(and particularly with justifications for slavery) but not changing at all for women, the only caste – 
at least in Europe and America – where people think it is completely natural for there to be 
irremediable inequality: women, in the view of almost everyone alive, just are not equal to men.14  
3. Socialism as the Means to Emancipation and Equality. 
Having charted their similar – but not identical – arguments about marriage, women’s oppression, 
and slavery, I turn in the last part of this article to considering Wheeler and Taylor’s suggested 
solutions to the issue. Both, at root, suggest this has to be equality – that is meaningful equality, 
not mere equality of legal rights (though these are an important first step). Both argue that this kind 
of equality is a ‘higher pleasure’ (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, xi; Taylor, Marriage, 17-24). Both also 
endorse socialism as the ideal future for humans. Wheeler is more definite in saying female equality 
is impossible without socialism, a position which is also discernible in Taylor’s views, though never 
stated overtly. 
Wheeler was very involved with contemporary socialism, particularly Owenism, Saint-Simonism 
and Fourierism. Thompson (‘Introductory Letter’ ix-x) describes Wheeler as ‘look[ing] forward to  
a … society, where the principle of benevolence shall supersede that of 
fear; where restless and anxious individual competition shall give place to 
mutual co-operation and joint possession; where individuals in large 
numbers, male and female, forming voluntary associations, shall become 
a mutual guarantee to each other for the supply of all useful wants, and 
form an unsalaried and uninsolvent insurance company against all 
insurable casualties; where perfect freedom of opinion and perfect 
equality15 will reign amongst the co-operators; and where the children of 
all will be equally educated and provided for by the whole.  
Thompson and Wheeler thought ‘the principle of individual competition’ being ‘the master-key 
and moving principle of the whole social organisation’ and ‘individual wealth the great object sought 
after’, ‘it seems impossible – even where all unequal legal and unequal moral restraints removed … 
– that women should attain equal happiness with men’: biological factors ‘must eternally render the 
average exertions of women in the race of the competition for wealth less successful than those of 
men’ (Thompson, ‘Introductory Letter’, x). Thompson (xi) adds that they thought: 
Were all partial restraints, were unequal laws and unequal morals removed, 
were all the means and careers of all species of knowledge and exertion 
equally open to both sexes; still the barriers of physical organisation must, 
under the system of individual competition, keep depressed the average 
station of women beneath that of men. Though in point of knowledge, 
talent, and virtue, they might become their equals; in point of 
independence arising from wealth they must, under the present principle of 
social arrangements, remain inferior.  
That is, what might be thought of as ‘liberal feminist’ reforms would be useful, but could never be 
sufficient for female equality. The whole system of competition needs to be replaced with 
cooperation for equality to occur. This is both because competition systematically discriminates 
against women (and the social structures of gender and women’s education though exacerbating 
this, also flow naturally from this structural iniquity), and because only in cooperation will both 
men and women’s characters be changed sufficiently for them to experience the ‘higher pleasure’ 
of life among equals.  
Speaking of his and Taylor’s ideal view (and in a text which Taylor had chance to edit), Mill says 
they saw the ‘social problem of the future’ being ‘how to unite the greatest individual liberty of 
 
14 Interestingly, the ‘marriage as slavery/women as slaves’ trope is more visible in Mill’s work (see particularly Subjection 
of Women, 264-267 and 271). He even added a footnote to the 1859 reprint of Enfranchisement which called working-
class women, in particular, ‘household slave[s]’ (Mill, footnote to Taylor, Enfranchisement, 404. See also editor’s notes 
to the publication history of this work on 393.)  
15 Jose (‘Without Apology’, 842) highlights how this phrase also links Thompson, Wheeler, Taylor and Mill. 
action, with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of 
all in the benefits of combined labour’. Their ideal ‘society will no longer be divided into the idle 
and the industrious’ and ‘the division of the produce of labour, instead of depending … on the 
accident of birth, will be made by concert, on an acknowledged principle of justice’ with ‘human 
beings … exert[ing] themselves’ for benefits which would be ‘shared with the society they belong 
to’ (Mill, Autobiography, 239).  
They thought ‘cooperative societies’ might be the best way of achieving this ideal society (Mill and 
Taylor, Principles, 793-94). ‘Associations of the labourers with themselves’, spreading gradually 
throughout society until almost all industry (including agriculture) was organised on cooperative 
lines (with some additional state provision), ‘in perhaps a less remote future than may be supposed’, 
‘may’ effect ‘a change in society, which would combine the freedom and independence of the 
individual, with the moral, intellectual, and economical advantages of aggregate production’ 
without needing a violent revolution. 
[This] would realise, at least in the industrial department, the best 
aspirations of the democratic spirit, by putting an end to the division of 
society into the industrious and the idle, and effacing all social distinctions 
but those fairly earned by personal services and exertions … a 
transformation … thus effected, (and assuming of course that both sexes 
participate equally in the rights and in the government of the association) 
would be the nearest approach to social justice, and the most beneficial 
ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it is possible at 
present to foresee (Mill and Taylor, Principles, 793-94).  
Taylor may also have been more open to communism than Mill, though the evidence for this is 
scanty, relying solely on part of Mill’s half of their correspondence on the issue (Mill, Mill-Taylor 
Correspondence, 1026-27). She seems to have thought there was much to be gained for happiness 
from the guarantee of subsistence made under communism (which Mill thought might be over-
exaggerated by those who had never experienced it). She also thought that society might adopt 
communism within fewer generations than Mill did (who thought there might be something of a 
chicken-and-the-egg problem: certainly, communist teachers could raise communist children, but 
who would have made these communist teachers in the first place?). In this, she may have been 
endorsing more communal schemes than Mill in general advocated (though arguing that those who 
wanted to make these experiments in living should take the chance), or she may only have been 
advocating ‘equal shares’ (the core principle of communist distribution as they saw it) as a more 
feasible and desirable principle of justice within cooperative associations than Mill. (In Principles, 
they advocate an initial adoption of principles akin to Fourierism, ‘allowing to every one a fixed 
minimum, sufficient for subsistence, the[n] apportion[ing] all further remuneration according to 
the work done’ – which, interestingly, meets Taylor’s endorsement of the importance of securing 
subsistence without needing to endorse full-blown communism – and endorse ‘equal shares’ as a 
‘higher’ principle of justice than securing for the labourer the fruits of their own labours, and the 
Blancian principle of ‘from each according to their capacities, to each according to their needs’ as 
a ‘still higher’ principle (Mill and Taylor, Principles, 203 and 782-84).)  
There are several similarities between this view and that of Thompson and Wheeler in Appeal (and 
with Thompson in Inquiry). There are also interesting links with Owenite ideas and Fourierism 
regarding small-scale communities, inter-relations between members, distributive justice, and the 
transition to socialism, as well as a shared feminism (see McCabe, ‘Mill and Fourierism’, pp.35-61). 
Given Wheeler’s links to the Saint-Simonians, it is also worth noting that Mill describes Taylor’s 
most-significant contribution to Principles being the setting of its ‘tone’. This may sound slight, but 
it refers to the foundational ontology of the book, and its view of the difference between laws of 
production (which are laws of nature) and laws of distribution (which are human constructs), the 
recognition of which opens up the space for consideration of a more just socialist future. Mill 
(Autobiography, 253-57) acknowledges that this is a Saint-Simonian idea, but says Taylor ‘made [it] a 
living principle pervading and animating the book’.  
Mill/Taylor and Thompson/Wheeler envisage a transformation of both economic organisation 
and individual human character – both being inextricably linked to, and influencing, the other. Men 
and women will be capable of equal relationships and ‘benevolent’ feelings16, as well as being able 
to tolerate freedom of speech and action (and eccentricity of personality) among their fellow 
citizens. There will be meaningfully equal participation in work and government in these 
associations, with women no longer being confined to the entirely domestic sphere where, if they 
are not domestic ‘drudges’, they live lives of enforced idleness. (It is worth considering a feminist 
angle on the commitment that all shall work, as well as recognising that Wheeler/Thompson and 
Taylor/Mill recognised domestic labour as work, and the necessity for society to recognise it as 
such. (Mill, Autobiography, 239; McCabe, ‘“Good Housekeeping”?’, pp.135-155.))  
Mill and Taylor saw as the greatest difference between their views and those of socialists like 
Thompson and Wheeler their inability to share the socialist antipathy to competition. As noted, 
Thompson and Wheeler see a system of individual property, based on and necessitating, individual 
competition to be innately biased against women, and one of the core causes of their inequality. 
Taylor and Mill (Principles, 794-96) do not take on this feminist critique of competition, instead 
offering arguments for competition based on considerations of efficiency (of production); and 
increased quality and lower prices (for consumers), reminding socialists that ‘wherever competition 
is not, monopoly is; and that monopoly, in all its forms, is the taxation of the industrious for the 
support of indolence, if not plunder’. They recognise many of the ills associated with competition, 
but insist that it is not, in itself, the root cause of all social evils.  
This said, their commitment to competition can be over-stressed. As they point out (Principles, 795), 
‘if association were universal, there would be no competition between labourer and labourer; and 
that between association and association would be for the benefit of the consumers, that is, of the 
associations; of the industrious classes. They acknowledge the moral case against competition put 
forward by socialists, preferring a society characterised by fraternity. But they also think 
associations would stagnate, and people’s faculties ‘rust’, ‘unless their knowledge of the existence 
of rival associations made them apprehend … that they would be left behind in the race’.  
We should, however, ask what kind of race. Elsewhere in Principles (754) – and even more strongly 
in Chapters on Socialism (which may have some input from Taylor, despite being published after both 
her and Mill’s death, as they discuss a separate work on socialism in correspondence). Taylor and 
Mill  
confess [they are] not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who 
think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; 
that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other’s heels, 
which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of 
human kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the 
phases of industrial progress.  
Similarly, they claim: 
the power … of emulation, in exciting the most strenuous exertions for 
the sake of the approbation and admiration of others, is borne witness to 
be experience in every situation in which human beings publicly compete 
with one another, even if it be in things frivolous … A contest, who can 
do most for the common good, is not the kind of competition which 
Socialists repudiate’ (ibid., 205).17 
 
16 See Cory (‘Rhetorical Re-Visioning’, 120) for an interesting analysis of Wheeler’s view of gender power-relations 
in socialism.  
17 Again, this has strong echoes of Fourier: see McCabe, ‘Mill and Fourierism’, 35-61. 
They describe competition between cooperative associations as being conducted in a spirit of 
‘friendly rivalry in the pursuit of a good common to all’ (ibid., 792).  
It is important, then, to note that the ‘race’ in which associations might be left behind is not like 
the ‘race’ described by Mill in Chapters (713) – that is, the contemporary ‘race’ for existence created 
by the current system of private property in which those who ‘come hindermost’ are ‘put to death’ 
for no other fault than being slower than their competitors. Instead, it is more like an Olympic 
race, run for medals and public acclaim. In Taylor and Mill’s preferred institutions, no one would 
be allowed to suffer privation (never mind death) through poverty or lack of employment; there 
would be no competitive labour market; and feminist reforms and better education would keep the 
supply of labour under control (a primary cause, in their view, of low wages). If associations went 
out of business, then, through stagnation, inefficiency, or simple ineptitude, social safety nets and 
the chance of re-employment in other cooperatives would protect workers from penury. 
Thompson – in Inquiry – envisaged a series of self-sufficient communities, though Wheeler’s 
interest in Saint-Simonism (a system organised at the national level, with everyone being an 
employee of the state, contributing, and rewarded, according to his or her abilities) means she may 
have not been wedded solely to small-scale socialism. Similarly, Fourier (who Wheeler translated 
into English), also pictured small-scale, self-sufficient communities, made harmonious via a range 
of competing ‘series’ of workers, all emulating each other and striving to out-do one another in 
excellence. In what has been called his ‘second-best’ utopia (Stafford, ‘Paradigmatic Liberal’, 330), 
Thompson also envisaged competition between mainly self-sufficient ‘villages’ for goods and 
services, though not in the labour market (Thompson, Inquiry, 156-57, 168-70 and 274-80).  
There are, then, two main differences between the Wheeler/Thompson view and the Taylor/Mill 
one. Taylor and Mill envisaged cooperative associations, rather than self-sufficient communities. 
That is, rather than the population being re-distributed to roughly equally-sized villages throughout 
the country, we might live in the contemporary mix of urban and rural settings, whichever best 
suited the industry in which we were engaged, and our home lives could be separate from our place 
of work. Similarly, where Wheeler and Thompson see villages ‘trading’ (in some sense), Taylor and 
Mill envisage producer-cooperatives producing goods which are distributed by consumer 
cooperatives. Under the Rochdale model, goods are sold to members of the cooperative, and any 
profits made distributed among those members (with a portion reserved for mutual insurance, and 
often other services such as libraries). So something approximating cost price is actually paid, in 
the end, by the consumer. The same could be applied to sale of goods by producer coops, 
redistributing profits to buyers and thus trading at something like cost price, while retaining the 
advantages for quality, efficiency and innovation provided by competition between rival producers 
all motivated by emulation rather than profit.  
Socialists like Wheeler and Thompson would no doubt have concerns that Taylor and Mill do not 
eradicate enough of the individual property system to properly free women from domestic 
servitude, even if they would free them from political and civil ‘slavery’ through their preferred 
reforms. That is, in not embracing the communal living elements of many socialist schemes, and 
retaining more nuclear family structures in individual houses (Principles, 209), Taylor and Mill do 
not succeed in freeing women. These charges are not without merit.  
On the other hand, Taylor and Mill’s preferred institutions do do away with many of the evils of 
competition which Wheeler and Thompson thought lay at the root of women’s inequality. In 
Taylor and Mill’s ideal society, we are no longer motivated by a desire for individual wealth, but 
communal well-being, and so individualistic competition is no longer ‘the master-key and moving 
principle of the whole social organisation’ – instead, fraternal concern with one another’s well-
being is, aided, in terms of social mechanisms, by human psychology’s urge for emulation and 
desire for praise. In itself, the idea of ‘a contest, who can do most for the common good’ (Mill and 
Taylor, Principles, 205), is not innately gendered. Female biology, that is, need not ‘eternally render 
the average exertions of women’ in this ‘race’ ‘less successful than those of men’ (Thompson, 
‘Introductory Letter’, x). Women’s enforced absence from the labour market to have children, that 
is, might always be a disadvantage in a race for individual wealth, but given the importance of 
parenting to the common good, this does not immediately disadvantage women in a socialist 
society (even without the hope that parenting, too, would be more equal, and that domestic work 
which might conceivably be linked to female biology (such as breast-feeding) would also be 
recognised as socially-important work). 
Certainly, if a sort of ‘masculine’ ideal still permeates cooperative society – if only work done outside 
the home in producer-cooperatives (and perhaps at traditionally masculine work, be that hard 
physical labour, engineering/manufacturing or the professions) is recognised as contributing to the 
social good, then women will be disadvantaged in terms of rewards in the same sort of ways, though 
the rewards would be very different. However, though no longer a matter of life and death, they 
would have serious consequences of equality, and allow the notion that women are just worth less 
than men to persist. This said, the same fear might be raised over Thompson and Wheeler’s idea 
of self-sufficient villages, if there was also a gendered division of labour within them.  
Overall, then, Wheeler is more strident in her claim that the system of individual property and 
particularly competition for individual wealth needs to be dismantled if women are to be freed 
from ‘slavery’, and men and women made equal. Taylor supports both equality for women and a 
radical restructuring of the economy towards communal property and cooperative associations. 
Her insistence on securing minimum subsistence may have feminist roots – after all, it secures 
women from dependence on fathers, brothers and husbands (at least if they work, and/or want to 
separate from the husbands or live independently from their families – something which was, at 
the time, almost impossible for women to do without finance and approval from a male relative). 
This, however, is not stated forthrightly in her work, and – in the main – she treats of feminism 
and socialism separately (while noting both that it is to the socialists credit that they are, in the 
main, feminists, and that her preferred socialist institutions must allow women an equal role). Given 
her insight into how the patriarchy affects all elements of progress, however, and her evident belief 
that socialism was a key part of human progress, it might be the case that this separation in 
published works is a political decision more than seeing the issues as not really related. That is, like 
Wheeler, she may well have believed that ‘liberal’ feminist reforms (i.e. equal rights) would not be 
sufficient to end women’s subjection, but still have thought there were a necessary first step, and 
one which was more easily to be accomplished by advocating a single argument (i.e. regarding the 
vote), rather than also bringing in claims about economic justice. (She may also have desired to 
make the demand for women’s votes seem less radical and dangerous than working-class demands 
for a mixture of political and economic reforms, and thus be more likely to win her case.) 
This said, both women are alike in their analysis of women’s subjection, marriage, and individual 
property relations. Wheeler goes further than Taylor, being more willing to call marriage slavery; 
and firmly labelling eradication of individual property, and a social system based on competition as 
necessary for female emancipation. They both had strong interests in the work of Owen, 
Thompson, Saint-Simon and Fourier, and in the events of 1848 in Paris (which Wheeler was invited 
to participate in, though declining due to ill health, and from which Taylor learned a great deal 
regarding the possibilities of ‘association’). They both saw themselves as socialists, and had similar, 
though not identical, preferred institutions, in which the achievement of emancipation, social 
justice, fraternity and equality was not just a question of redistribution of economic assets, but also 
a question of fundamentally changing human nature such that meaningful equality between the 
sexes was not only realisable, but recognised to be a core element of happiness.18  
 
18 I would like to extend my thanks to Alison Stone, Charlotte Alderwick and two anonymous reviewers for comments 
on this piece, as well as the organisers and attendees of “Wollapolooza!” at APSA 2018 and 2019; ISUS 2018; CSiW 
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